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REVIEW ESSAY

“NEITHER KNAVES NOR FOOLS”

Thomas C. Hone

The War Lords and the Gallipoli Disaster: How Globalized
Trade Led Britain to Its Worst Defeat of the First World War,
by Nicholas A. Lambert. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press,
2021. 368 pages. $49.95.

This thoroughly researched and very well written book is based on the research
that Nicholas Lambert did for his Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare
and the First World War, published in 2012. In his earlier book, Lambert showed
how the global trade network that Great Britain constructed before World War I
was a decidedly two-edged weapon when Britain went to war with Germany in
the summer of 1914. On the one hand, the ability of the British government to cut
German trade and finance out of the network suddenly might hamper the German
economy so severely that the German government would find it impossible to continue the war; on the other hand, strangling German trade and finance would affect
other nations’ economies, including those of the United States and even of Britain.
The War Lords and the Gallipoli Disaster picks up where Planning Armageddon
left off. Lambert shows how economic and social factors rooted in Britain’s global
trade network shaped the decision by the British War Council (the “War Lords”
of the title) to order British (joining with French) naval and land forces to capture
the Dardanelles in 1915. Lambert has read the military histories of the Gallipoli
campaign, but his research shows that comprehending why that campaign occurred—and occurred the way it did—requires an
Thomas C. Hone is a former professor at the Naval
War College and a former principal deputy director understanding of the role of wheat in Britain’s war
of program analysis in the Office of the Secretary of
strategy.
Defense.
Wheat? Why did wheat—specifically, Russian
Naval War College Review, Winter 2022, Vol. 75, No. 1
wheat—play an important role in the decision to
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attack the Turkish defenses of the Dardanelles? Lambert answers that question
by first noting that the major belligerents assumed that the war would not last
long. “Home by Christmas” may have been a wish that the troops on both sides
voiced in 1914, but the leaders of the warring states hoped for it as well. Great
Britain, for example, did not have a process in place to guarantee that British bakers would continue to have flour on hand to make affordable bread for Britain’s
population if the fighting continued into 1915. British political leaders assumed
that the commerce of wheat production and distribution, coupled with the commerce of open-market bread production and sales, would feed Britain’s millions
adequately. They also assumed that the tsar’s regime could supply the Russian
armies with sufficient ammunition. Both assumptions turned out to be wrong,
and Lambert deftly explains why.
The heart of Britain’s problem was the insistence of Sir John D. P. French, the
commander of the British Expeditionary Force in Flanders, that a stalemate did
not exist on the western front. French argued that, with more troops and artillery,
his force could crack the German trench line in 1915, and Herbert H. Asquith,
the prime minister, “could not and did not take the political risk of ignoring the
professional opinion of the senior field commander” (p. 264). However, if French
had it wrong—as indeed he did—then the war could drag on; and if it did, the
Asquith cabinet—and not just the War Lords—had to do its best both to gain a
victory and to not destroy the British economy in the process.
French’s was not the only military proposal on the table as the War Lords met
at the beginning of 1915 to consider Britain’s next move in the war. Winston
Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, pressed his colleagues to adopt a plan
to seize the Dardanelles. His argument was that doing so would not prevent the
British forces in Flanders from making a major attack on the German lines in
1915. Moreover, opening the Dardanelles would knock the Ottoman Empire out
of the war—thereby allowing Russian wheat to flow into world markets, preventing a price surge that Britain ill could afford.
Lambert makes a strong case that the War Lords went along with Churchill
“primarily for political, not military, reasons.” Britain needed a victory to justify war losses already sustained; Russia needed to export its wheat so it could
buy needed ammunition; British workers needed the wheat to live; and Britain
needed to keep Russia in the war. Lambert observes that “[f]or the most important decision-maker—the prime minister—the weight of the evidence indicates
clearly that the wheat issue was paramount in his mind” (p. 267). But it did not
retain that position for Asquith. By late March 1915, after initial attempts by
British and French warships to force their way through the straits had failed,
Asquith and his colleagues faced a choice: Back down and call off the attacks on
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the Turkish defenses or press on with a major amphibious assault? They chose
the latter—and lived to regret it.
For Lambert, the failure at Gallipoli—especially the thinking and discussions
that preceded the actual military assault—illustrates the dilemma facing the
builders of any global economic system in wartime. If they create a worldwide
system of free trade in peacetime and then engage in what they think is decisive
economic warfare, they run the risk of robbing their system of the confidence
on which it is based. Free trade is built on the expectations and perceptions of
multiple participants in its system of communications, finance, and shipping. A
government that decides to manipulate those systems drastically runs the risk of
wiping out those expectations and wrecking the very system that is the source of
its great influence. That was the dilemma facing the British cabinet as it explored
the chances of gaining a quick and decisive victory in the Dardanelles.
As Lambert shows, Asquith and his colleagues were aware that they faced a
situation of “damned if you do and damned if you don’t.” Lieutenant Colonel
Maurice P. A. Hankey, who was secretary to the War Council (and therefore to
the War Lords) after November 1914, and whom Lambert quotes, put it well:
“We were neither knaves nor fools. We were dealing, under circumstance of
great pressure and difficulty, with a problem of appalling complexity” (p. 261).
It is not as though no one had warned them previously; in 1903, then–Prime
Minister Arthur J. Balfour had noted that the “difficulties which we have to face
are difficulties which are inherent in our position, and which nothing can wholly
remove” (p. 272).
Even as Lambert illustrates the “difficulties,” he also warns historians to take
heed of the economic, social, and even psychological factors that influence
decision-making in wartime. As he states, “This book is an attempt at intentbased, rather than outcome-based, history” (p. 261). Why did the War Lords
approve military operations in the Dardanelles? Was there one basic reason,
and was that reason the only one that really mattered as the leaders in London
considered the alternatives before them? Lambert’s answer, based on his careful
and thorough research, is no. “The blinding rapidity with which events occurred
and opinions altered makes it difficult to generalize or point to any single set of
reasons” why the Asquith cabinet chose to attack the Dardanelles (p. 262). This
should sound familiar to today’s Americans trying to understand where U.S.
policy in Afghanistan came from.
Related to this rejection of a single cause for the Gallipoli campaign is Lambert’s understanding that trying to apportion blame is a misguided effort. What
matters is trying to understand the intentions of the principal actors, how those
intentions were formed and sometimes changed, and how the principal actors
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saw themselves and their tasks. As Lambert asserts, “The contextual breadth,
explanatory precision, and archival research necessary for intent-based history
exceeds the norms of conventional naval and military history” (p. 261). He thus
throws out a challenge to military historians to wrap their minds around all the
major factors that shape decision-making.
As Lambert writes, “Temporarily separating out the various component parts
[military, economic, etc.] may be necessary for analytical purposes but the artificiality of this separation must be constantly borne in mind” (p. 276). And as
far as the issue of personal responsibility is concerned, his last words in the book
never should be forgotten: “All the threads [in making decisions] were knotted
together on [decision makers’] desks every day. The collective weight of all this
complexity was crushing and inhibited decision-making. Historians are obliged
to re-create that narrative tapestry as best as possible. Before we can say whether
their decisions were right or wrong, we must truly understand why they were so
difficult” (p. 280). Wise words from one of our finest naval historians.
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